After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in 1657, Ukraine experienced a period of instability that historians would later call the Ruin. The Tsardom of Muscovy, ostensibly supporting the Ukrainian hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, concentrated its army on the borderlands and sought to exploit the unstable situation in the Cossack Hetmanate.

The Muscovites sent an envoy to the Poltava colonel Martyn Pushkar, who had made a deal with the Zaporozhian Sich’s ataman Yakiv Barabash and dreamed of winning the hetman’s mace with the support of the tsar. Hetman Vyhovskyi suppressed the rebellion of Pushkar and Barabash, but the Moscow government continued to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian state.

On September 16, 1658, the hetman signed the Treaty of Hadiach with the Poles, which stipulated that the Cossack Hetmanate would become the Grand Principality of Rus’ and receive an equal place in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth alongside Poland and Lithuania. Vyhovskyi was prompted to take this step by numerous violations by the tsarist side of the interstate agreement concluded in Moscow following the Pereiaslav Agreement. Instead of the promised military support in the fight against the Poles, the Muscovites concluded a separate truce with them, interfered in the internal affairs of the Cossack Hetmanate, and incited the opposition to armed protests.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Hadiach, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich of Moscow issued a charter declaring the start of hostilities against the Cossack Hetmanate. Belgorod voivode Hrihorii Romodanovskyi’s army joined forces with Hetman Vyhovskyi’s adversaries, including Ivan Bezpalyi (who was appointed hetman in November 1658), osavul Voronko, and the Cossacks led by kish ataman Yakiv Barabash. Together, they captured Myrhorod, Lubny, and Pyriatyn.

The enemy was driven out of Ukraine in late 1658. Ivan Vyhovskyi rejected boyar Aleksei Trubetskoi’s offer of negotiations, sarcastically noting that it was extremely dangerous to meet with boyars, as one could lose one’s head in such meetings.

In the spring of 1659, the army of Muscovy under the command of Aleksei Trubetskoi invaded Ukraine; modern researchers claim that its strength was 50,000 men. In addition to the elite cavalry of the Moscow nobility, the prince commanded militia, Don Cossacks, and detachments of Kadom and Kasym Tatars living in Muscovy.

The Muscovites destroyed Sribne, Borzna, and the suburbs of Nizhyn, but were stuck near Konotop, which they began to besiege on April 21, 1659. Ivan Vyhovskyi appealed to the Crimean Tatars for help in the fight against Moscow, and Mekhmed IV Gerai did not refuse.

The 5,000-strong Cossack unit of Nizhyn colonel Hryhorii Hulianytskyi heroically defended the city for more than two months, allowing Ivan Vyhovskyi to mobilize the Ukrainian army (16,000) and bring in the 30,000-strong Crimean army of Khan Mekhmed IV Gerai and mercenary units of foreigners from Germany, Poland, Serbia, Moldova, Wallachia, and Transylvania to help. In total, the combined Cossack-Crimean army numbered about 50,000 soldiers, making the opposing forces equal.

On July 4, 1659, Vyhovskyi defeated the advance detachment of the Moscow army near the village of Shapovalivka and approached Konotop. The decisive battle began on July 7, when the hetman attacked Trubetskoi’s army on the march and captured many horses in a sudden attack.

The next day, the 30,000-strong Moscow cavalry of Siemon Pozharskyi moved in pursuit of Vyhovskyi, who crossed the Sosnivka River and encamped. Meanwhile, Stepan Hulianytskyi’s unit, unnoticed by the enemy, destroyed the river crossing and dammed the river.

On the morning of July 9, the Cossacks attacked Pozharskyi’s camp and then simulated a retreat. When the enemy left the camp and found themselves in a narrow ravine, Crimean Tatar units ambushed them. The Moscow army was surrounded and almost all of it was eliminated within a day.

It is believed that up to 30,000 Muscovites were killed in the Battle of Konotop, and another 15,000 were taken prisoner (including Pozharskyi himself and dozens of noble voivodes). Observing such a massacre, Trubetskoi hastily lifted the siege of Konotop and began to retreat in the evening. The Cossacks and Crimean Tatars pursued the fugitives to the Moscow border. Trubetskoi miraculously escaped capture, although he was wounded twice, and the Muscovites lost their artillery, treasury, wagon train, and battle banners.

For three more days, the Cossacks and Crimeans pursued the fugitives to the Moscow border, but failed to eradicate the enemy: the final stage of the operation had not been properly thought out in advance.

Unfortunately, Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi’s brilliant victory over the Moscow army near Konotop did not change the overall situation in the war. Due to the difficult political situation in the Cossack Hetmanate, Vyhovskyi could not repeat Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi’s 1618 campaign against Moscow. Although the consequences of the Battle of Konotop were terrible for the Moscow state, in general, it emerged victorious from the Ukrainian-Moscow War of 1658-1659.

However, the Battle of Konotop debunks many Russian myths, especially those about the “eternal friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples,” the “enmity of the Cossacks with the Crimean Tatars,” the “historical aspiration of Ukrainians for an alliance with Russia,” and the “invincibility of Russian weapons.”