After the occupation of Crimea in 2014, youth became one of the priority areas of the Russian Federation’s policy on the peninsula. Promising a “bright future,” the occupying authorities have consistently imposed Russian “rules”: changing educational programs, suppressing the Ukrainian language, and restricting access to Ukrainian history and culture. In doing so, they are shaping a new identity among the youth of Crimea, one that is loyal to the aggressor state.
After 2022, this process became even more overt. While previously the youth were ideologically “re-educated,” now they are being more actively prepared for future service in the Russian army—through militarized clubs, militarized camps, and the involvement of military personnel in school and university life. This trend is observed throughout Russia, but in occupied Crimea, it has distinct features: it combines ideological pressure, the economic vulnerability of the population, and a targeted recruitment campaign.
Throughout January and February 2026, the Mission recorded a steady increase in activities aimed at agitating youth for military service in the armed forces of the RF—from local “career guidance” meetings to mass forums and public appeals from regional leadership. Promotional stands have appeared in schools and universities with offers to attend “motivational” events or participate in so-called career guidance. At the same time, students are not just invited but are actively involved in such events.
For example, on February 24, an event was held in Simferopol with the participation of about a thousand students from the “V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University” and secondary vocational education institutions. The so-called Krympatriotcenter set up thematic stations with shooting, Kalashnikov rifle disassembly, a weapons exhibition, and first-aid demonstrations. On February 26, in Sevastopol, over a thousand students took part in a forum where combat veterans spoke about the tactics of using drones on the front lines, and representatives of military recruitment offices provided contact information for signing contracts. In essence, this is not about education, but about normalizing war as a part of everyday life for young people.
Additionally, Russian military personnel, particularly from the Southern Military District of the RF, are conducting classes in technical colleges, promoting the newly created “unmanned systems forces.” Students are shown drones and told about their use in combat operations against Ukraine. Separately, military commissars in the schools of the occupied peninsula are also holding meetings with 9th-11th grade students, convincing them of the “prospects” of service.
In parallel, the occupying administration is increasing financial “motivation.” The so-called governor of Sevastopol announced an increase in the one-time payment for signing a contract to 2.3 million rubles, as well as the allocation of a land plot or an additional one million rubles. Crimean promotional materials also announce higher cumulative payments—up to 5 million rubles for the first year with “regional bonuses.”
This is not a coincidence, nor is it a voluntary choice for the youth. It is a targeted effort aimed at the most vulnerable—those who grew up under occupation and have been involved in militarization programs like “Yunarmiya” from childhood, lacking access to full development opportunities. For many of them, the multi-million ruble payments appear to be the only social ladder in a region where the occupation has destroyed the economy, education, and prospects.
Russia is essentially monetizing the desperation it has created. First—isolation, narrowing horizons, and systematic propaganda. Then, an “attractive offer” to sign contracts with the armed forces of the RF. In this way, the occupation authorities are turning the youth of Crimea into a resource for continuing the wars that Russia is waging.
Moreover, as an analysis of the contracts shows, after the probationary period, individuals who have signed a contract can be transferred to any position—including infantry—without the right to terminate the agreement, despite all verbal assurances of “rear” or “safe” service.
The consequences of this campaign will be long-term. The mass death of a whole generation, trauma, and losses—all of this creates deep social wounds. Russia is deliberately planting time bombs under the future reintegration of the peninsula.
The recruitment campaign in Crimea is not just about the war today. It is about an attempt to deny young people the right to a different future. It is about a systematic policy that replaces education with militarization and development with participation in armed aggression. And that is precisely why it is important to document this trend, call it by its proper name, and actively counter it.