The truth: The Zboriv Treaty of 1649 secured the recognition by the king of an officially autonomous, but in fact, independent Cossack state within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This agreement took into account the interests of both the Crimean Tatars and the Cossacks, and therefore, neither the events leading up to the treaty nor the treaty itself can be considered a betrayal.

Russian historiography is built on manipulation and lies, which the Russian Federation conveniently uses for propaganda and to justify its crimes. One such crime is the destruction of the subjectivity and dignity of the Crimean Tatar people, which the Russian Empire and its successors — the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation — have been committing for over 300 years. The Crimean Tatars were unjustly and baselessly branded as “traitors” when the Soviet government criminally deported them from Crimea in 1944. The myth of the so-called “treacherous nature” of these people is still used by Russian propaganda to sow discord between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.

In reality, Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar relations date back to pre-Khanate times and cannot be described as openly hostile. There were certainly periods of mutual raids between the Crimean Tatars and the Cossacks, but there were also times when they fought side by side against a common enemy. Therefore, the alliance between Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and İslâm III Giray was not the first alliance between the Crimean Tatars and the Cossacks. However, it became one of the most well-known.

It was as a result of this alliance that the Zboriv Peace Treaty was signed, around which the myth of the Crimean Khan’s betrayal was built.

Searching for Allies 

During the national liberation struggle of 1648, the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth suffered a series of painful defeats and was coerced to agree to a truce with the Cossack and Crimean forces. Furthermore, in May 1648, the Polish King Władysław IV died. Without a monarch whose election was delayed, the situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was unstable. Therefore, Khmelnytskyi negotiated with the Poles, seeking to achieve broad autonomy for Ukraine within a united state through peaceful means. However, the Polish nobility was not willing to make concessions to the rebels, considering the national liberation struggle to be a “rebellion of the commoners” that needed to be suppressed by force.

This is the first point that should be highlighted.

All of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi’s attempts to achieve his goals diplomatically and to force the Poles to grant the Cossacks the right to broad autonomy failed. Khmelnytskyi was neither a recognized ruler nor a member of a ruling dynasty. Therefore, the hetman was forced to seek the protection of other states that had both power and influence and, most importantly, could sign internationally recognized agreements.

Understanding that the truce with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would be short-term, at the beginning of 1649, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi once again embarked on active diplomatic efforts.

First and foremost, the hetman again turned to the Crimean Khanate. At that time, the Crimean Khanate was an important political and military power in Eastern Europe, playing a significant role in maintaining the balance of power in the region. It was a crucial ally that had already proven to be quite effective in the joint resistance against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To defeat the Polish army, cavalry was essential, which the Cossacks lacked. The Crimean Tatars were considered among the best cavalrymen in Europe at that time.

However, Khmelnytskyi did not seek help from Crimea alone in his struggle against the Poles. He also continued negotiations with the Prince of Transylvania, which had been ongoing since November 1648 but had not resulted in a solid alliance. Prince György II Rákóczi hesitated to march against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Likewise, the Tsardom of Moscow, to which Khmelnytskyi had appealed in an attempt to involve the Muscovites in an anti-Polish campaign, did not dare to directly confront the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in alliance with the Cossacks.

Thus, in the new phase of the national liberation struggle in 1649, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi entered side by side with the same ally — the Crimean Khanate. It is important to emphasize that it was not only the military cavalry forces that interested the hetman in this alliance but also the influential status that the Crimean Khanate held in Eastern Europe at the time. In other words, both the Polish king and the Crimean Khan İslâm III Giray represented distinguished dynasties and were sovereigns of their states. At the same time, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, in terms of his status under international law at the time, was merely a subject of Jan Kazimierz, and thus, he did not even have the right to conclude agreements with the Polish king in his name.

Moreover, the newly elected king Jan II Kazimierz did not plan to grant autonomy to the Cossacks or maintain the truce. Therefore, on May 9, 1649, the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth called for a general campaign against the Cossacks.

The Events of Summer 1649. Defeat of the Polish Army 

In June 1649, the Ukrainian Cossack army launched an offensive in two directions: the main forces under Bohdan Khmelnytskyi advanced to the West, while a portion of the regiments, led by Colonel Mykhailo Krychevskyi, moved toward Polissia to prevent a flank attack by the Lithuanian forces.

In 1649, the Cossacks defeated the vanguard of the Polish army under the command of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, surrounding the remnants of the enemy in Zbarazh Castle. Between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers found themselves trapped. 

However, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi understood that the decisive battle was still ahead. He deliberately did not seek to capture the camp of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki in Zbarazh and wasted his forces on an assault. Instead, he aimed to lure the Polish king into battle.

King Jan II Kazimierz indeed gathered a 30,000-strong army and set out to assist the besieged forces. Upon learning of this, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi left part of his army to continue the siege under the command of Ivan Chernyata, while he quickly moved with his main forces to meet the king. The main forces of the Ukrainian and Polish armies met near Zboriv on the Strypa River.

On August 15, King Jan II Kazimierz’s army was surprised by a surprise attack. The Polish army was not prepared for the attack, as it expected that the Cossack-Crimean army was still besieging Zbarazh.

The Polish troops were forced to cross the river and set up camp under constant fire from the Cossack artillery. They tried to fortify their positions throughout the night but failed to complete the defensive structures. The next day, the Crimean Tatars, together with the Cossacks, launched a successful attack and repeatedly breached the Polish camp.

Thanks to the resilience and counterattacks of German recruits, the king avoided defeat, but the situation for the Polish army became critical. Due to the lack of men, provisions, and low morale, Jan II Kazimierz began secret negotiations with the Crimean Khan Islam III Geray.

Some historians claim that the Khan allegedly did not want to risk the potential creation of a powerful Cossack state and thus demanded that Khmelnytskyi stop the battle. Allegedly, the hetman was forced to enter negotiations, which ended with the signing of the Zboriv Peace Treaty on August 18, 1649, as he could not fight both the Crimean Tatars and the Polish forces simultaneously.

Certainly, it could have been called a betrayal if İslâm III Giray had signed a treaty with the Polish king, completely ignoring the needs of the Cossacks and forgetting the agreement he had signed with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in 1648.

However, the truth is that in 1649, after the Zboriv Treaty was signed between İslâm III Giray and the Polish king, Jan Kazimierz also agreed with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, which took the form of the “Declaration of Grace.” As mentioned earlier, this form of agreement was the only one possible under international law at the time. It is worth recalling that all of Khmelnytskyi’s attempts to achieve such agreements on autonomy with the Polish king without the mediation of the Crimean Khan had failed. It is also worth noting that Khmelnytskyi never sought the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; rather, he fought for economic and territorial autonomy within a united state.

It was the agreement between İslâm III Giray and the Polish king that forced Jan Kazimierz to accept the so-called “Articles of Khmelnytskyi.”

Thus, the myth that the Khan allegedly abandoned Khmelnytskyi and negotiated with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth solely in his interest is not true.

To prove this, we should turn not only to the terms of the Zboriv Treaty but also to the agreement between the hetman and the Khan of 1648.

Preliminary Agreements 

The conditions of the Zboriv Treaty and its consequences indicate that such a step was not an improvisation by İslâm Giray. The provisions concerning the fate of the Cossacks were not invented solely by the Crimean Khan. Giray adhered to prior agreements with Khmelnytskyi, made in 1648.

Unfortunately, the text of this agreement has not survived. Still, there is evidence suggesting that the issues of territorial and economic autonomy for the Cossacks were discussed with the Crimean Tatars from the very beginning.

In the records of Samuel Kazimierz Kuszewicz, a member of the Lviv magistrate’s council, there is a description of the main points of the March 16, 1648, agreement between Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and İslâm Giray. This information was recorded from the words of Tugay Bey, the Khan’s military leader, who was one of the four Karachi, individuals ranked only slightly below the Khan himself, and who was entrusted by İslâm Giray to aid the Cossack army in its struggle against the Poles.

Since Tugay Bey was not only present at the state council where the alliance with the Cossacks was discussed but also one of the direct executors of the agreement, he knew the text of the agreement well.

According to Kuszewicz’s records, Tugay Bey demanded that the Grand Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, who officially outranked the Zaporozhian Cossacks, fulfill two conditions that were most likely based on the Crimean Khan’s agreement with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. These same conditions later appeared in the Zboriv Treaty of 1649.

From Tugay Bey’s testimony, it appears that the agreement between the Khan and the hetman from March 1648 was based on two conditions:

1. There would be no Polish administration on the territory of Ukraine, and Cossack rule would prevail there.
2. All noble estates on Ukrainian territory would be transferred to the Cossacks.

In the Ukrainian territories, Khmelnytskyi planned to establish a Cossack state, which Tugay Bey, in his testimony, referred to as a separate principality. 

The Ukrainian historian Mykola Kostomarov also wrote about a conversation that took place between the captured Grand Crown Hetman Potocki and Tugay Bey.

“Can peace reign between the Poles and the Cossacks?” he asked Potocki. “Out of respect for the Christian religion,” the Crown Hetman replied, “the Commonwealth will grant them peace on fair terms so that we might know what the Cossacks desire.”

“First,” said Tugay Bey, “you must give them a separate state up to Bila Tserkva, return their former freedom, and ensure that your governors and elders in the cities, castles, and villages have no authority.”  

“These terms are too heavy for the Commonwealth,” Potocki responded, “I do not think they will be accepted.”

“And if the Commonwealth does not grant them this,” said Tugay Bey, “you will have much trouble. We have sworn a hundred-year brotherhood with the Cossacks and promised to stand together against all enemies, not only against the Polish king but even against the Turkish sultan himself. We fear nothing in our eternal alliance with the Cossacks.”

Thus, as we can see, Khmelnytskyi had his own vision of the future of the Cossack state long before negotiations with the Crimean Tatars began.

And it was this vision that İslâm Giray adhered to, even when defending his own interests.

The Crimean Khanate’s Stance 

İslâm Giray’s decision to intervene in the Polish-Cossack conflict was not an easy one. To do so, he had to break the peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and, more importantly, violate the peace between the Ottoman Empire and Poland. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Khan would have taken such steps if he had not seen an autonomous Cossack state as a beneficial long-term ally.

First of all, let’s recall that the Ottomans were engaged in a war with the Venetian Republic in the 1640s and demanded assistance from the Crimean Khan. Unlike the Cossacks, the Crimean Tatars did not have successful experience in naval campaigns, so İslâm Giray was able to present the Zaporozhian Cossacks as valuable allies to the Ottomans.

The war with Venice forced the Ottoman government to increase the number of ships powered by slave labor, raising the price of captives. And it was this valuable jasyr (captives for enslavement) that the Crimean Tatars could seize on the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Moreover, for four years, the Crimean Tatars had not received the customary tribute (upominki) from the Poles. Thus, financial motives also significantly influenced Giray’s decision to ally with the Cossacks. 

Given all of the above, the myth of the Khan’s so-called “fear of a strong Cossack state” does not seem credible.

However, Giray did have certain concerns regarding international politics.

By intervening in the Polish-Cossack conflict on the side of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, İslâm Giray sought to weaken the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the international stage.

Weaken it, but not destroy it completely 

The complete destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its disintegration would lead to instability in Eastern Europe and strengthen Muscovy, something the Crimean Tatars did not desire. If Moscow no longer faced a strong international player in the region like the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it could focus its efforts on conquering Crimea.

Thus, after defeating the Polish army together with the Cossacks at Zboriv and placing the Polish king in a highly unfavorable position, İslâm Giray chose the moment to sign a treaty that would grant the desired autonomy to the Cossacks, allow the Crimean Tatars to take jasyr on Polish lands, and preserve a weakened Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that would be much easier to influence in such a state.

The terms of the Zboriv Treaty and its consequences

According to the terms of the Zboriv agreement, within the three eastern voivodeships of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth — Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv — the territory of the new Cossack state, known in history as the Hetmanate, was established.

This treaty restored the Ukrainian state for the first time in 300 years since the fall of the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia. Although it was recognized as autonomous within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, its dependence on Poland was minimal. Poland was forced to legally recognize the autonomy of the Cossack state, and thus, Ukraine became a subject of international law. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi began active diplomatic efforts, establishing contacts with Turkey, Moldavia, Wallachia, Venice, and England.

Moreover, the conditions imposed on Jan Kazimierz, and recorded by İslâm Giray III’s biographer Hacı Mehmed Senai, show that the Crimean Khan did not neglect the needs of the Zaporozhian Cossacks or the agreement signed with Khmelnytskyi in 1648.

“… about the Zaporozhian Cossacks who asked for our help… to forty thousand Cossacks, according to their wishes, you will pay without fail, and from now on you will not even look askance at the fortresses, villages, and areas that belong to the Zaporozhian Cossacks.

If even one of them complains, it will mean you have violated the agreement and will be punished.

Until now, the Zaporozhian Cossacks were your subjects — from now on, they will be the dominant military and ruling force, and you will be their subordinates and subjects. In addition to paying the forty thousand registered Cossacks, many times forty thousand of your people must serve the relatives of these forty thousand Cossacks — this will be the extent of their power over you.”

The Zboriv Treaty was published in the German, English, and French press, and a portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi appeared in an album register of contemporary European rulers. Thus, Khmelnytskyi gained what he had lacked up until that point — a status that allowed him to sign internationally recognized treaties on an equal footing with other European rulers.

Conclusion

We cannot deny or refute the claim that a different scenario in 1649 might have altered the course of history for the Ukrainian state in a positive direction. Everyone is entitled to their own conclusions. However, history does not recognize the conditional mood. Therefore, we do not speculate on what might have happened if the Polish king had been completely defeated in 1649 and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been utterly destroyed.

However, summarizing all that has been written, it can be confidently stated that Khan İslâm Giray did not violate the agreements made between him and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. It is also worth noting that their cooperation did not end there; the alliance continued until Giray’s death in 1654.

In September 1651, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi signed the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, which almost completely returned the Cossacks to the conditions that existed before 1648. There was no longer Cossack autonomy, the Cossacks’ influence was limited to the Kyiv Voivodeship, and the size of the Zaporozhian Host was reduced to 20,000. In December 1653, at Zhvanchyk, İslâm Giray III once again supposedly “betrayed” Khmelnytskyi and negotiated with Jan Kazimierz without the hetman’s involvement. This “betrayal” resulted in the annulment of the failed Treaty of Bila Tserkva and the restoration of the Zboriv Treaty.

To conclude the debunking of this myth, it is worth quoting from a letter Bohdan Khmelnytskyi sent to Crimean Khan İslâm Giray III on April 16, 1654. In this letter, the hetman emphasizes that he himself was satisfied with the Zboriv Treaty:

“We had secured peace and were awaiting royal privileges,” but it was the Polish side that disrupted the peace of the Zboriv Treaty.

Khmelnytskyi also reaffirms his oath to the Crimean Khan in his letter:

“…for all eternity, neither we nor our descendants will break your oath…”

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